Dhe Islamic Republic of Iran has been regularly predicted to come to an end since it was founded in 1979. However, it proved to be amazingly resilient and has already surpassed the lifetime of the GDR. However, the question that is becoming ever more pressing is whether the accelerating waves of protest herald the end of their life cycle. Because ideologically the Islamic Republic is empty. It no longer has any vision for the future to offer its people.
For the first time in the nationwide protests that began on September 16, several social classes come together: the impoverished lower class and the impoverished middle class, the bazaar and the universities. The existence of the regime does not yet appear to be under acute threat. The one with the guns has the upper hand. It is not foreseeable that significant (para-)military units will switch sides. The tipping point could be when that happens and guns fall into the hands of protesters.
Two scenarios are conceivable for Iran in the near future. Neither will make dealing with the country any easier. The first scenario concerns the succession plan for the 83-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei, who is in poor health, at the head of the Islamic Republic. During the 33 years of his rule, the top priority was to preserve Khomeini’s 1979 revolution and its principles. With this in mind, he is now regulating his successor.
To this end, over the years he has marginalized (and ultimately excluded) the forces that wanted to open up the Islamic Republic with reforms, such as former Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami. He promoted those committed to the principles of the revolution. These include hostility to the United States and Israel, narrow “Islamic” morals, and exclusion of political opposition.
At present there is no one who could succeed Khamenei as revolutionary leader. President Raisi, although a hardliner, is considered a lightweight. With Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, a dynastic settlement, the regime would lose even more credibility. It cannot become a general of the Revolutionary Guards, since their candidates have always failed miserably in elections.
Revolutionary Guard with a huge arsenal of weapons
This indicates a leadership council that could include Raisi, Mojtaba Khamenei and a general. The power would lie with two other circles. They would ensure that the principles of the revolution would not be violated. The most important center of power in the post-Khamenei era will be the Revolutionary Guard. Their armed forces are among the largest in the world, they are equipped with a comprehensive arsenal of weapons and millions of volunteers, run a feared secret service, control the media and half the economy.
As little information as possible should leak out of the country: Still image from a video on a platform run by Iranian students
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Image: AFP
Due to the privileges of their companies, private individuals have no chance against them. The term “Revolutionary Guards”, which is often used in German, plays down its meaning. They are not a kind of Swiss Guard, but a troop that, to use the Persian term, sees itself as a resolute “guardian of the Islamic Revolution”.
Foresightedly, Khamenei has built up a second pillar of power. While his predecessor Khomeini had gathered only a small circle of confidants around him, Khamenei laid a network across the country with his “Office of the Supreme Leader”. It consists of four thousand people who are characterized by a strong esprit de corps. They are his personal representatives in the provinces and numerous institutions and look after the interests of the state.
Iranians want freedom
With such a constellation, the Islamic Republic would become a military dictatorship. However, Khamenei and his potential successors have to grapple with the question of whether they want to use economic and social freedoms to relieve the pressure on them in order to forestall the emergence of a critical mass that could start a revolution.
Should a revolution succeed, and this is the second scenario, the country would face implosion. Unlike in 1979, there is no organized opposition abroad, let alone at home, to fill the vacuum. It is completely unclear what could take the place of today’s repressive and sclerotic system.
A collapse would thus extend the axis of failure that runs through the Middle East eastward. The Shiite crescent, which stretches from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea and was an Iranian show of power for two decades, would become an axis of failed or failing states. The desire for freedom resounds in Iran. But there is a risk that the country will pose an even greater geopolitical threat in the future.
