German foreign policy in a world with Trump and Putin

Außenpolitische Fragen haben in deutschen Wahlen immer wieder eine Rolle gespielt. Man denke nur an Gerhard Schröders Wahlkampf gegen eine deutsche Beteiligung am Irakkrieg im Jahr 2002. Aber als wahlentscheidend gelten sie normalerweise nicht.

Unterschiede zwischen den Parteien gibt es da immerhin, sogar große: AfD und BSW wollen letztlich einen Ausgleich mit Putin, andere Parteien die Eindämmung Russlands. Und auch da gibt es Unterschiede, etwa hinsichtlich der Unterstützung der Ukraine. Umfragen zu dem Thema ergaben kein schlüssiges Bild. Mal lagen „Frieden und Sicherheit“ vorne bei der Frage nach den wichtigsten Problemen, mal nicht. Die Wirtschaft und natürlich vor allem die Migration spielten im Wahlkampf bisher eine größere Rolle.

Spätestens nach der Bildung einer neuen Regierung dürfte die Außenpolitik aber wieder mit Macht auf die Tagesordnung zurückkehren, weil sich die Bundesrepublik in einer historisch nie da gewesenen Lage befindet: Es gibt wieder eine Bedrohung aus dem Osten, aber anders als im Kalten Krieg ist sie diesmal „heiß“. Noch gravierender ist, dass der Fortbestand des amerikanischen Schutzschildes ungewiss ist. Entscheidend ist dabei nicht einmal, ob das viel zitierte Zwei-Prozent-Ziel der NATO erfüllt oder hochgesetzt wird. Schon allein die Tatsache, dass Trump Zweifel an seiner Bereitschaft geweckt hat, die Verbündeten zu verteidigen, schwächt die Abschreckung der Allianz. Putin kann es in sein Kalkül einbeziehen.

In einer Demokratie sagt meist die Verfassung, was ein Land außenpolitisch tun kann, zumindest in groben Zügen. Ein Blick ins Grundgesetz offenbart zunächst, dass die Bundesrepublik auch in der Außenpolitik ein Gegenentwurf zur Nazizeit sein sollte. Das deutsche Volk sei „von dem Willen beseelt, als gleichberechtigtes Glied in einem vereinten Europa dem Frieden der Welt zu dienen“, heißt es gleich in der Präambel.

Article 24 describes how this should happen: “The federal government can classify a system of mutual collective security to maintain peace; He will consent to the restrictions of his sovereign rights, which bring about and secure a peaceful and permanent order in Europe and between the peoples of the world. ” Finally, it is shown in Article 26 of what is in no way possible: “Actions that are suitable and are intended to disturb the peaceful coexistence of the peoples, in particular to prepare for the leadership of a war of aggression, are unconstitutional. They are punishable. “

These three guidelines (custody of peace, international cooperation, prohibition of the war of aggression) have repeatedly shaped the German attitude towards the world, only for the old Federal Republic and after the accession of East German countries that of reunited Germany. In practice, however, they were not always easy to follow, as the Bundeswehr's debate on the Bundeswehr foreign missions showed in the 1990s. The Federal Constitutional Court had to clarify the question, and it invented the so -called parliamentary reservation, of which nothing stands in the Basic Law.

Does this continue to help in the 21st century, which will probably be shaped by a sharp competition between individual large powers and several middle powers? (Germany belongs to the latter, if not militarily.) The answer is probably Jein. Germany should certainly not lead a war of attack even today. But the most important “system of mutual collective security”, which has joined NATO, goes towards an insecure future. In general, the will for cooperation decreases. “In the restriction of his sovereign rights” hardly wants to consent to a country, not even in Europe.

So what to do? German society will not be able to avoid making a better concept of the world in which it is alive and what should be the goals of foreign policy in it. In political science there are several theory schools on international politics, the oldest of which best suits today: so -called realism. In its modern form, he assumes that there is a fundamental difference between interior and foreign policy: domestic politics is characterized in most countries, especially in the western, by a government, enforcing laws and order can maintain. This does not exist in world politics, there is no world government and no world police. In an realistic view, the states have to assert themselves internationally in an “anarchy” that one also speaks of a “self -help system”. To put it colloquially: everyone is the next.

This modeling does not mean that there is chaos in world politics, even if the daily news may often be suggested. There is international law with all the institutions that it has produced, especially the United Nations, and there are many other intergovernmental agreements, from cultural exchange to trade agreements. The jumping point is that there is no overriding authority in the anarchic system that can enforce these rules in the event of a dispute. This applies even to international jurisdiction that has been built in the past decades. Ukraine successfully sued the attack by Russia before the International Court of Justice, but Putin simply ignored the judgment.

Therefore, realists refer to the outstanding importance that power in world politics has. Whether a country achieves its goals, whether it can live peacefully, depends on how strong it is, primarily how strong it is military. Economic strength is a prerequisite for this, but in the end it never causes as much as rifles or tanks. This is one of the oldest teachings in history.

The most important principle according to which world politics works is the so -called power balance after this school. No country was ever so strong that it could control the whole world, even if it always tried some. In practice, weaker countries come together to build a counterweight against stronger countries (so -called “balancing”), or they become followers of a strong state (so -called “band wagoning”). Even if the transitions can be fluid, the EU can be seen as an example of the former. The European middle powers are merged here in order to assert themselves against more powerful states such as China or (at least in trade issues). NATO can be seen as an example of the latter, because the nuclear, who are weak in the nuclear, have allied themselves here with a strong country like America to gain security, formerly against the Soviet Union, today against Russia.

The realistic theory has never been particularly popular in Germany. She was taught on the political chairs, but preferred theories that were geared towards cooperation. This corresponded to the zeitgeist for a long time and ultimately also the Basic Law. There is no question of power, it is about universal goals such as peace and international understanding.

You won't have to say goodbye to that today, but a dose of realism needs German foreign policy without a doubt. What we observe every day is a result of changes in power balance: China rises, perhaps also India; New counterweights to the West are created like the Brics Group. America loses, at least relative, even more Europe. Germany makes this change particularly strongly because it is a medium power with moderate military equipment. It would not be able to survive in the current constellation of the anarchic system. Particularly needs partners for their military protection. The Bundeswehr's recovery alone is not enough, even if it is outstandingly important: allies have to be offered something.

In the public debate, these aspects have so far been weakened. The traffic light was not the first federal government to spend the creation of a “rule -based order” as a foreign policy goal, and even worldwide. Basically, foreign policy in Germany is still presented as an extension of domestic politics. Our values ​​should be anchored globally, from climate protection to women's rights. Realists only shake their heads there.

What does that mean specifically? You cannot derive a government program from a theory, it is too abstract. But certainly our country has to learn to get an understanding of power policy. German foreign policy often fails with the analysis: one cannot at the same time be “partners, competitors and systemic rival”, as the German Chinese strategy says. Either you create a counterweight to the country, or you alloy yourself with it. For this reason, German Russian policy failed so miserably, Germany wanted both. So you should be careful when choosing your partners, and proven allies should be maintained. Even if he doesn't make it easy for us: this also applies to America under Trump.