History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes: at the end of the 1970s, the German Reich replaced a more liberal foreign trade policy with an aggressive customs policy. In the face of an economic crisis and cheaper imports from abroad, agriculture and industry, the “alliance of rye and iron”, had pleaded in favor of higher tariffs. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck followed this demand after a long hesitation.
For the turnaround to build high trade barriers, politicians called different, sometimes conflicting reasons. Since the cheap imports were interpreted as an attempt to harm Germany to harm Germany, they had a security component.
Bismarck also wanted to fill up the state treasury with income from higher tariffs; At the same time, however, he also promised to use the higher tariffs as a negotiating mass in order to achieve general tariff cuts in international negotiations. When other countries answered with counter -tariffs, Berlin was insulted.
“Politics to damage the neighbors”
The customs policy of the late 19th century is now also considered an expression of a rivalry of great powers as well as attempts to damage mutual damage through trade restrictions between the two world wars. In the globalization of the late 19th century driven by technical progress, customs policy caused tensions in domestic politics. Since their overall economic costs remained tolerable, one speaks of a time of the “protective duties”. In the interwar period, however, Protectionist foreign trade policy worked like a fire accelerator in the economic crisis at the time. Therefore, there is talk of a “policy to damage the neighbor” for this time. The concrete effects of customs policy remain context -dependent; This applies to the past as announced for Donald Trumps on Wednesday evening.
As was often said, Trump's politics differs from the politics of his predecessors more in style than in the substance. Since the First World War, the United States has perceived the dominance of a autocratic power over the Große Eurasian continent as incompatible with their strategic interests. This conviction did not only shape her actions in the two world wars. Richard Nixon was looking for the approach to Beijing in the Cold War between the West and the Warsaw Pact. At that time China was the weaker in the duo of the two large Eurasian autocrats.
Today, despite all the nuclear weapons, Russia is significantly weaker than China; Trump is not the first American president to see the United States primarily in a competition with Beijing. In mirror image to Nixon, Trump is therefore looking for an approach to Moscow today to loosen the band between Putin and XI.
Washington can only afford this policy from a position of strength. However, the United States are at risk of overwhelming their still impressive economic potential with their political and military ambitions. The historian Paul Kennedy described the economically induced decline of former great powers in a classic decades ago. From the point of view of American geopolitical thinkers, a lot that Trump pushes seems sensible. The Panama Canal is of great importance for securing important sea routes as Canada and Greenland. A strong military power requires a strong industry, which in turn requires unhindered access to energy sources and critical raw materials.
Trump himself is the greatest danger to realizing these plans. Precisely because America's power threatens overstretched, close cooperation with allies appeared more obvious than by bragings, threats and insults. However, Trump's appearance in the Rosengarten of the White House was a cancellation of prosperous cooperation. Lightning strategic insight is replaced by outbreaks reminiscent of vengeance, to which the desire for a “deal” can be joined without any strategic significance.
“If he mercilessly uses tariffs as a means of pressure, he will certainly squeeze out allies and opponents equally. But the damage to the economic competitors could be weighed up by America's self -impact,” warns political scientist Hal Brands. Trump's “Day of Liberation” is a day of discomfort – not only for America's partner, but also for America itself.
