Véronique Zanetti’s book Varieties of Compromise

KStanding up for a cause uncompromisingly earns admiration, at least when it’s a good cause. Nonetheless, the willingness to compromise should not be lower in the course of everyday virtues than the determination that cannot be swayed; rather probably higher, at least in our democratic-liberal societies. Contemporaries who are sociable, who allow themselves to be talked to and who make concessions in disputes seem to be the ideal choice for the role of fellow human beings under conditions of political and ideological pluralism and increasing cultural diversity. But willingness to engage in dialogue and goodwill are not always enough to resolve dissent. And even if, in addition to good will, there is also sufficient understanding on the part of all parties to the conflict and there is no time pressure that strengthens self-assertion reflexes, it may be that the exchange of arguments is not able to resolve a dispute.

Actually, it is just such situations of insurmountable differences of opinion and divergence of interests in which compromises are – first and foremost – required; Situations in which no consensus can be reached, unless there is consensus that there is a dissent. However, if a reconciliation of interests is still being seriously sought, those involved in a dispute would have to agree, with all other disagreements, that they want to avoid an escalation. Naturally, desperadoes and gamblers hardly come into consideration as candidates for an active willingness to compromise.

You do what you don’t want to do

In her book Varieties of Compromise, Véronique Zanetti speaks of the “possibility of a last refuge”, which is one of the few that deal with the topic from a philosophical point of view. The title suggests it: the author, who works as a professor of political philosophy at Bielefeld University, focuses on the amazing diversity of the phenomenon called “compromise”, which also has considerable gray areas of ambiguity. However, she is just as interested in what might be called its varietal purity, the combination of features that distinguishes it from related phenomena in the broad field of conflict resolution. For example, it distinguishes a compromise situation from a moral dilemma in which each of the remaining choices is wrong in a moral sense; and she compares the willingness to compromise with the virtue of tolerance, which generously tolerates in others what goes against the grain.

A compromise also links rejection with acceptance in a certain way. In the spirit of Zanetti’s meticulous description of the problem, it will be closed “not without a certain amount of regret”. Even if under the given circumstances nothing better could have come of it, and even if his refusal would have led to a worsening of his (own) situation, i.e. if the opponents acted wisely in the sense of an inconsiderable rationality of self-preservation, even then and the compromise remains an “unsatisfactory trade”. Because those involved are compromising on their original intentions, it inevitably appears from their perspective as only the “second-best solution”. The compromise thus moves into a twilight state, although it is intended to help peaceful coexistence. “You do what you don’t want to do,” Zanetti put it pointedly.